Andrew Bongjune Choi
I am a PhD candidate at Department of Economics, University of Chicago.
I work on microeconomic theory, including mechanism design, information design, and matching.
I am on the 2022-2023 job market and am available for interviews.
Mailing Address: The Kenneth C. Griffin Department of Economics, 1126 E. 59th Street, Chicago, Illinois 60637
Abstract: A principal gradually receives private signals about his payoffs before deciding whether to retain or fire an agent and wants the agent to stay until he decides. The agent values being retained but faces a decreasing outside option and would rather leave if she does not expect to be retained. The principal optimally induces the agent to stay by committing to make a promise, that is, by committing to make an early decision and communicate this decision to the agent. The principal’s truthtelling incentives introduce distortions. If the agent’s initial outside option is high, she stays too often and is retained too often relative to the efficient benchmark. The principal may promise to retain the agent when he knows he will prefer to fire her. The principal may ask the agent to stay until he fully learns his payoffs, only to fire her; this does not necessarily mean that the principal leads the agent on. We apply our results to worker retention, holdup, and forward guidance.
"Matching with Searching"
Abstract: We introduce search friction into the two-sided matching model with transfers by requiring that a worker-firm pair can match only if they are acquainted. Each worker may conduct a costly search to acquaint himself with new firms. A matching is stable if there are no blocking pairs among acquainted agents and no worker wishes to conduct a search. A matching is efficient if it maximizes total surplus given the acquaintance of agents, and no searching can increase total surplus net of search cost in expectation. All stable matchings are efficient, but not all efficient assignments can be made stable.